Can your AI show someone data they shouldn't see?
We run it with your team, on the assistant you're about to approve, such as Claude or ChatGPT Enterprise with connectors to SharePoint or Drive. Nothing to install. Made-up patient records only.
- Sign off. Written approval, two test accounts: user A, and user B who owns the restricted records.
- Plant made-up records. Our kit generates fake patient notes with hidden markers. If your network forbids bringing files in, one script you paste in generates them instead. You put them where user A shouldn't reach: B's private folder, a restricted folder, an over-shared one, plus two documents with hidden instructions.
- Ask six questions as user A, 10 times each in fresh chats, and save the answers and the assistant's logs.
- Score it against your own rules. We write your access rules down once, and each one passes or fails: which marker leaked, to whom, and how. A run that can't prove anything says so instead of passing.
- Clean up the planted files, chats and test accounts.
The report is yours to keep: what leaked, through which path (sharing, permissions or instructions hidden in documents), and what to fix. If you go on to a pilot, the same prompts run again through TenWall. If your team builds its own retrieval pipeline, a probe tests that layer directly, with the same made-up records.